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Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real
Gerard E. Lynch*
I. INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this talk can be simply stated: In any serious discussion of revising
the Model Penal Code (MPC), the object of the game cannot be revising the MPC
itself. Rather, the object of any revision of the Code is to promote the reform of the
nation's actual criminal codes, as adopted by the state legislatures and Congress.
II. WHAT IS THE MODEL PENAL CODE?
In deciding whether to reform or revise a document or institution, one must first
address what the subject of the reform effort is. Before deciding whether the
institution is serving its purposes well or badly, in other words, we must ask ourselves
what purposes it is supposed to serve. The MPC is and does a number of things,
though I suspect its predominantly academic audience of today is constitutionally
predisposed to underappreciate its primary role, as intended by its authors and as it
actually functioned in history. As all criminal law scholars understand, the Model
Penal Code is one of the great intellectual accomplishments of American legal
scholarship of the mid-twentieth century. In many ways, it marks the culmination of a
project of re-interpreting and systematizing the common law of crimes that began with
Wechsler and Michael's A Rationale of the Law of Homicide in 1937,' itself recently
celebrated as one of the most important law review articles of the last 100 years.2
Surveying hundreds of years of common-law evolution in the criminal law,
identifying underlying principles, and formulating rules that represented the best of
the thinking of judges who had grappled over that period with the violent and
destructive results of the unruly passions of humankind, the drafters of the Code,
marshaled by the incredible energy, formidable intelligence, and sheer will of the
great Herbert Wechsler, developed an intellectually coherent approach to this mass of
material, and created a body of rules not only doctrinally consistent, but drafted for
easy adoption by legislative bodies.
. Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia University, and United States District Judge,
Southern District of New York.
1 Herbert Wechsler& Jerome Michael, A Rationale ofthe LawofHomicide: , 37 COLuM. L. REv.
701 (1937); Herbert Wechsler& Jerome Michael, A Rationale ofthe Law ofHomicide: 11, 37 COLUM. L.
Rrv. 1261 (1937).
2 See Alan C. Michaels, "Rationales" of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judgmental
Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 54,56 (2000) (part of an issue devoted to the most significant articles
to have appeared in the journal's 100-year history).
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This last point is crucial. Unlike other influential projects of the American Law
Institute (ALI), which were formulated as restatements of the common law-general
statements of principle digesting the state of the common law, intended to be
consulted by judges as guides to case-by-case decision making, and projected to be
revised or re-restated periodically as the law evolved-the MPC was conceived as a
model statute, a true code that was intended to be adopted, as modified to fit the
individual circumstances of particular states, by legislatures throughout the United
States. As such, its roots stretch back to the codification movement of the early
nineteenth century, and it represents one of the last of the great codes that largely
superseded judicial law-making in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in important
fields like procedure, commercial law, and evidence.
This recognition, however, points up another remarkable fact about the MPC.
For unlike many other monuments of legal scholarship, the MPC was also one of the
most successful law reform projects in American history. The Code did not simply lie
on a library shelf, to be studied by academic lawyers. Rather, it sparked a wave of
legislation that lasted over a decade. It produced revised, modernized penal codes in a
substantial majority of the states, all recognizably derived from the work of Wechsler
and his colleagues, and nearly all adopting the structure and many of the formulations
they invented.3
This wave of law reform came to an end in the late 1970s with the failure of the
federal criminal code reform effort. Since then, the MPC has lived on as a monument
of scholarship and as a teaching tool. Essentially every criminal law coursebook in
widespread use in American law schools reprints the MPC, rather than any state's
actual code, as the one example of an integrated criminal code students are exposed to
in substantial completeness. Professors draw freely on the Code's provisions to
illustrate the problems that arise in defining criminal conduct, and (in most subject
areas) to offer the best, or at least serious if flawed, solutions to those problems. If the
MPC's force as a law reform effort is spent, and its phenomenal success in that
respect a matter of historical fact rather than current political importance, the Code
lives on as the document through which most American lawyers come to understand
criminal law.
Of the three major functions of the MPC-scholarly compendium of the best
thinking of its era about criminal law, practical reform project, and criminal law
textbook-most criminal law professors encounter the Code primarily in the first and
third. Most younger and middle-aged academics themselves learned criminal law
from the MPC or MPC-influenced texts, and effectively all of us use the Code in the
classes we teach. No one addressing a substantive criminal law subject in a scholarly
article can ignore how the MPC treats the issues addressed, or can fail to make use of
its commentaries as a guide to the literature up to the late middle twentieth century
and to the principal legislative solutions that existed at that time. Only the older
members of our guild were professionally active during the code reform efforts of the
1960s, however, and few indeed have actual experience with practical penal code
3 See Herbert Wechsler, Foreword, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, at xi (1985).
220 [Vol 1:219
REVISING THE MODEL PENAL CODE
draftsmanship. It is no wonder, then, that many criminal law scholars are unfamiliar
with the Code's potential as a law reform instrument, and come to the idea that the
MPC is in need of revision from a primarily academic standpoint.
III. REVISING THE CODE AS TREATISE AND TEXTBOOK
It is a remarkable tribute to the success of the Code's drafters (or perhaps it is
simply a consequence of the fact that criminal law deals with virtually timeless human
problems, so that the pace of its evolution is slow) that the Code remains a valuable
teaching tool, and that so many of its formulations remain the definitive statement of
what remains conventional wisdom about criminal law. But a half-century is a long
time in any field of law.
The Code is aging. Two generations of academic scholarship have unearthed
chinks in the intellectual structure. More importantly, a powerful upsurge in crime
and social disorder brought criminal law to the forefront of national concern. The
reactionary political response to the crime wave of the 1970s and 1980s was largely
focused on the courts and on constitutional criminal procedure, and not on the
substantive criminal law reforms of the MPC as such. Nevertheless, the political need
to do something about crime led to a vast increase in precisely the sort of ad hoc
criminal legislation that had, over two centuries, created the need for codification in
the first place. Moreover, that legislation tended to reflect an understanding of
criminal law somewhat at odds with the utilitarian, rehabilitationist consensus that
dominated the mid-twentieth century, and that provided the basic assumptions of the
MPC drafters. The most comprehensive intellectual attacks on that consensus, and the
most structurally significant criminal legislation of the late century-that relating to
sentencing-shared a significantly retributivist, just deserts perspective on the
purposes of punishment that is quite distinct from the perspective of the drafters of the
Model Penal Code.
Within the legal academy itself, new intellectual approaches have appeared. As
the tenure crunch of the late 1960s and 1970s squeezed out many who in other days
might have joined arts and sciences departments, and the boom in legal pay drove law
professors' salaries to higher levels than those of their colleagues in philosophy,
sociology and economics, the legal academy opened to a new generation of refugees
from those fields. Law faculties stopped being enclaves of brilliant lawyers who were
at best amateurs in other academic fields, as the new wave professors developed new
theories from the most sophisticated ideas in other disciplines. The same era saw a
rapid increase in the numbers of law professors from previously-excluded population
groups, and the concerns and insights of women and minorities raised new questions
and challenged old assumptions. A great deal that was assumed by Wechsler and his
colleagues is now questioned or rejected. It is not surprising that it is widely felt that
the Code is due for an overhaul, or that a group of law professors should convene and
ask, forty years on, whether a revised code is needed.
A doubter may wonder, however, whether the enormous effort that would be
involved in a massive revision of the Code is justified by the need for a new treatise or
20031
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LA W
school text. First, for all the new thinking that has emerged in criminal law and in
legal theory generally over the past two generations, the intellectual monument that is
the MPC still largely stands. Forty years after its promulgation, the MPC is still the
basic teaching tool in substantive criminal law courses in every law school in the
country. And the part of it that is primarily taught-the great Wechslerian
achievement of the general part and the law of homicide-is, amazingly, still taught
by most of us as representing correct principles of law, for the most part well and
effectively drafted. Those portions of the general part of the Code that are widely
regarded as failures by academics, such as the excessively complex complicity
provisions or the awkwardly-drafted portions of the attempt statute-provisions
which, by the way, were also widely rejected by legislatures-are the exception,
rather than the rule.
Moreover, the core provisions of the Code stand up remarkably well despite the
resurgence of retributivism or just deserts thinking. If anything, indeed, they have
solidified. Although Wechsler and Michael's seminal work on homicide was
explicitly utilitarian in emphasis, the general part of the Code Wechsler produced is
quite consistent with Kantian notions of fairness and desert. The emphasis on
subjective wrongdoing that dominates the Code's general part, its reluctance to admit
strict liability, its insistence on careful judgments of culpability-all of this can be and
is accepted by theorists across the intellectual spectrum. And all of it remains a lesson
and a reproach to the thoughtlessly punitive responses of legislators who too often do
not even consider issues of culpability in drafting political responses to the tabloid
crime dujour.
Second, there are few successful precedents for revisions of monumental
academic reference works such as the Code became. Many such works (think of the
great legal treatises like Wigmore on Evidence or Corbin on Contracts) are
continually updated by successor editors, though the valuable work of such editors
rarely rises (except perhaps by slow increments) to the level of a comprehensive
overhaul that has the impact on a new generation that their first editions did on those
who encountered the original. Others are simply superseded, as creative scholars
undertake the work of building a new comprehensive treatise based on the premises of
a new age or the insights of new generations. Most of these works, of course, are
those of individual authors or small groups of co-authors, not projects that undertake
to enlist the broad range of academics and practical thinkers to state not an individual
intellectual accomplishment, but the consensus of the profession. Those few projects
that do undertake radical revision have a mixed history of success. From the New
Grove to the new Encyclopedia Brittanica, such efforts range from valuable modem
reference works to dismal failures, but one is hard put to think of an example that
lived up to the intellectual power of its predecessor. Moreover, with law in particular,
the age of the great treatise sometimes seems to be altogether past.
But if there is a need for a new comprehensive text on criminal law, I doubt that
the will exists to produce a consensus-type document to fill that gap. Consensus is
hard to come by in today's academy, not only on a practical, political or legislative
agenda, but even on what questions are important or what intellectual approaches are
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valuable in answering them. Our post-modem era values diversity and fragmentation
in intellectual life more than it values consensus and middle-of-the-road "common
sense." The skeptic wonders not only whether it is worthwhile to commission a new
compendium of the current conventional wisdom on criminal law, but even whether it
would be possible to create such a document.
Third, there is not much practical value to revising the MPC as a teaching tool. It
is questionable whether we really want to teach from a document (even assuming one
could be created) that could be presented to students as containing the comprehensive
and accepted correct answers to problems. The fact that the MPC is in some respects
out of step with contemporary thinking hardly inhibits casebook authors or course
instructors in presenting newer ideas to students-as in every other field, course
materials are regularly revised to incorporate new developments in case law,
scholarship, and legislation. Where the MPC is so hopelessly out of date that it is not
even a contender in current controversies, as in the law of rape and sexual offenses,
4
there is no need to teach it, and most contemporary casebooks barely refer to it. There
is even a potential advantage to the fact that portions of the MPC have been
superseded by more recent thinking. The Code's time-bound errors serve as a useful
reminder that the law is not static, and that today's conventional wisdom will in many
respects be superseded as well. At any rate, as noted above, the MPC remains
significant in most of the areas that are at the heart of conventional courses in
substantive criminal law.
For these reasons, to produce a Model Penal Code Second for the sake of its
academic uses hardly seems worth the candle. Of course, developing new treatises
and course materials is valuable work, but there is strong reason to doubt that any
such work could or should bear the kind of consensus imprimatur that the Model
Penal Code bore in its time.
IV. THE NEED FOR PENAL CODE REFORM
If there is little need for another treatise or new teaching materials, there is a
pressing need for penal code reform. The case for such reform is comprehensively
laid out in Paul Robinson's contribution to this symposium, 5 and I will return below to
some specific issues on which a Code revision project can make a practical
contribution. Here I will merely sketch out some factors in the development of
criminal law since the completion of the MPC that have created the need for reformed
codes.
First, as successful as the MPC was as a reform project, a third of the states and
the federal government failed to adopt comprehensive reform in the wave of code
revision that followed its promulgation. In those jurisdictions, the desperate need for
4 See Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code s Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be
Pulled and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 207 (2003).
5 Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States From
Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169 (2003).
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code reform that drove the MPC project in the 1950s has not disappeared since then,
nor has any subsequent wave of reform improved matters. As Paul Robinson and his
colleagues have documented, the jurisdictions that failed to adopt the MPC in its
heyday have the worst and most confusing codes today.6 Yet it can hardly be
expected that a movement to reform these codes can be mobilized behind the banner
of the 1962 MPC. The reformist enthusiasm generated by the MPC is long since
spent, and the aging of the Code since its original adoption makes it an uneven model
for any present day code reform. A new MPC might not generate a new reform
movement, but it could at least provide a product that new reformers could rally
around with more confidence than they could embrace the original, superannuated
MPC.
Second, those codes that were adopted in the wake of the MPC have not
remained in stasis since then. Of course, no code would or should remain unamended
over forty years of legal experience, and many of the changes in criminal law during
that period represent improvements on the thinking of the 1950s ALI. But popular
discontent with rising crime rates from the 1960s to the 1990s created an urgent
political pressure for legislative tinkering that predictably affected criminal codes for
the worse. Although the populist demand for tougher law enforcement did not for the
most part attack the structure of MPC-influenced substantive criminal law (the
political focus was more on criticizing the Supreme Court's expansion of the
procedural rights of criminal defendants and on seeking increased penalties), some
MPC-supported liberalizations (as in the area of the insanity defense) were directly
attacked.
More significantly, however, as crime became a hot-button issue, legislators
desperate to show their constituents that they could take action adopted hundreds of
criminal statutes in response to real or perceived new or increased criminal threats.
Many of these statutes were duplicative of or inconsistent with existing general
criminal law, and few of them were carefully drafted to make use of the general
definitions and careful structures of the existing comprehensive penal codes. The
predictable result was a return to the same patchwork criminal law that had led to the
demand for codes in the first place. That the patchwork is now superimposed on a
reformed criminal code, which could have provided the template for a more careful
response to any genuine need for new legislation, is little comfort. Most criminal law
scholars, who pay surprisingly little attention to the actual state of the law, let alone to
the condition of the penal codes of particular states, have barely noticed the extent to
which this slow process of entropy has debilitated existing codes.
Finally, genuinely productive impulses for change have met with spotty
legislative success and have resulted in inconsistent formulations of popular reforms.
To take just one example, enhanced political power for women has led to widespread
changes in the law of sexual assault and self-defense. But the process of piecemeal
reform in a period of rapidly changing political consensus has produced a wide variety
6 See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (andFive Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1, 61 (2000).
[Vol 1:219
2REVISING THE MODEL PENAL CODE
of legislative models. States that were quickest to change have not kept up with
subsequent developments. Statutes drafted ad hoc in individual states were not
always known to, or adopted by, other states addressing the same problem. Not all of
the salutary reform notions were embodied in technically sound statutes. Reforms
initially greeted enthusiastically turned out to present unforeseen problems that either
left the law in an unsatisfactory state or produced a reaction that led to additional
patchwork fixes by legislatures or courts.
After all of this activity, in reformed as well as unreformed jurisdictions, the need
for code reform is great. A new MPC, if it focused on the areas in which a real need
and demand for reform has arisen, could be of great value to those seeking to reform
our criminal codes. We don't need a revised MPC for its own sake; we need a revised
MPC, if we need one at all, as a new model code for the sake of the new penal codes it
could influence.
V. OBSTACLES TO PENAL CODE REFORM
What made the MPC so successful as a blueprint for practical law reform? The
impact of the Code was intended by its drafters, but its success was the product of
circumstances unusually favorable to penal law reform. First, there was a widespread
understanding, not merely on the part of academics carping from the sidelines, but
also on the part of practicing lawyers, judges and even political figures, that the
criminal law of the American jurisdictions was a mess. Largely though not
exclusively statutory, American criminal law circa 1950 represented an overlay of
random statutes, adopted from time to time over nearly 200 years, on top of "codes"
that sought to approximately formulate, or sometimes merely to incorporate by
reference, concepts developed by English common-law judges. The resulting stew
included archaic and outdated laws, inconsistent treatment of similar acts, wildly
disparate penalties, and incomprehensible and unjust prohibitions. The field was
objectively ripe for reform, and was widely understood to be so.
Second, public and political opinion was receptive to law reform. The radical
rethinking of law spurred by the Great Depression and the New Deal engendered a
widespread public understanding that law was a product of policy that could and
should be rewritten to further the common good. The apparent success of Roosevelt's
reformers, so many of them lawyers and law professors, inspired a confidence that
laws could be changed and improved by earnest effort.
But if the New Deal provided a model and a liberal engine for legal reform, and
the victory in World War II and the phenomenal post-war prosperity built a spirit of
confident, can-do practicality, the essential conservatism and conformity of the 1950s
also contributed to the possibility of reform. A consensus model of politics and
history, the absence or suppression of threatening domestic radicalism, a widespread
trust in experts and leaders (perhaps modeled on the trust necessarily reposed in the
generals who had won the war and the scientists who were daily generating new
technology in weapons, space exploration, health and domestic convenience), and the
dominance of politics by a largely homogeneous group of white, male Protestants
2003] 225
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with largely similar life experiences and intellectual assumptions, all contributed to an
atmosphere in which a group of serious reformers could meet and thrash out
agreement on principles to guide a reform effort, secure in the knowledge that their
product would receive a respectful hearing from the largely similar folks in legislative
chambers, and from an electorate that had little occasion to meddle in technical
matters. If these features of the macro-political climate were favorable to legal reform
generally, so were factors more narrowly relevant to the Model Penal Code effort
itself. One was the state of legal scholarship. Legal academics were by and large
drawn from the ranks of practicing lawyers. Their demographics and intellectual
assumptions were also similar to those of the power elite, and their experiences and
aspirations were sufficiently similar to those of the bench and bar that academic
lawyers were able to speak effectively to the concerns that led judges and practitioners
to demand reform and to those of legislators who sought to provide it.
Finally, and perhaps in retrospect most importantly, crime rates were at historic
lows. The tumultuous birth pangs of the urban industrial society had passed, the
discipline of depression and war had generated the prosperity of the post-war era and
created a uniquely hard-working and optimistic citizenry, and social order reigned.
When officials in New York City point out that homicide rates there today are
comparable to those of the early 1960s, their pride reflects not merely the magnitude
of the recent sustained reductions in crime, but also the fact that the period to which
they are pointing was something of a golden era, often treated by criminologists as an
anomaly in modem history.
This fact was critical to the success of criminal law reform. It meant that crime
was not a hot-button electoral issue and was not in the forefront of political debate.
As the last years of the MPC-inspired wave of reform suggests, comprehensive
criminal law reform is fatally threatened by contentious, narrow-focused, politically-
motivated public debate. I don't merely mean that high crime rates generate a demand
for repressive or ill-thought-out quick fixes inconsistent with more reflective action,
although that is certainly true. But the fate of the effort to reform the federal criminal
code illustrates a subtler political dynamic. A massive bill with hundreds of carefully
formulated, delicately balanced provisions governing the daily work of federal law
enforcement, few of which were yet then controversial, foundered largely as a result
of Vietnam-era ideological conflict over a small number of provisions relating to the
protection of official secrets which, in the wake of the Pentagon Papers case, had
become an uncompromisable issue dividing proponents of open government from
those who feared wholesale and virtually treasonous release of sensitive information.
Comprehensive reform cannot easily survive when aspects of the proposed code-
even ones relatively peripheral to the concerns of the reformers-implicate the real or
symbolic political interests of closely-competitive ideological movements.
But the times, as the Bard tells us, have a-changed. The confident post-war
liberal consensus died in Watts, My Lai, and Chicago. Nostalgic yearning for order
and revived respect for authority may be strong enough to bring narrow electoral
majorities to conservative political parties, but these factors have not regenerated a
trust in technocratic expert reform. On the right as well as on the left, among both the
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intellectual elite and the popular majority that ignores electoral politics altogether,
there exists a widespread and profound mistrust of experts and leaders, and a general
assumption that politicians and intellectual leaders equally are motivated by self-
interest and partisan power-seeking. The hegemony of the old elites is shattered, and
has not yet been replaced by a new, more demographically representative and widely
trusted, ruling class. The legal academy, and indeed the professoriat generally, has
withdrawn into itself. In the 1950s, the myth that the universities were dominated by
dangerous leftists was powerful precisely because it was shocking (and, as it happens,
false) to imagine that these citadels of the establishment were secretly being
undermined by hidden subversives. Today, of course, radical professors themselves
tell us that intellectual elites are not to be trusted. The populist right takes it as a given
that universities are the preserve of loopy leftists totally out of touch with the people,
and the academy has largely lost both the interest in practical reform and the popular
respect necessary to give it influence. Left or right, the writings of the most
influential legal academics rarely deal with the practical law-reform issues that
concerned their predecessors. And while the crime wave of the late twentieth century
has (somewhat mysteriously) receded, its memory, and the politics it generated, are
still with us, in a way that keeps criminal law reform a dangerous minefield for
politicians.
7
Finally, unlike the 1950s and 1960s, there is no general belief among legislators
that overall criminal reform is needed. Those legislators who are not themselves
lawyers (a growing number) have little understanding of the technical issues of
statutory draftsmanship or general principles of criminal law. Those legislators who
are lawyers were taught in law school that, at least in those jurisdictions that adopted
MPC-derived codes two generations ago, the task of codification was long-since
accomplished. I hope Paul Robinson is correct that legislators themselves are
increasingly aware of the havoc that ad hoc politically-motivated legislation has
wrought over the last thirty years,8 but I see little evidence of it.
The times, then, are not propitious for a convocation of wise men (even if today
it includes wise women, and its wisdom is drawn from a much more diverse and
demographically representative group) to generate political reform simply by calling
attention to the technical inadequacy of existing law.
VI. A PLAN FOR REFORM
The existence of these various obstacles does not mean that reform is impossible.
Rather, it means that the momentum for reform needs to be carefully built, and that
initial reform efforts should focus not on the issues most compelling to academics, or
on an effort to restate and refine basic principles from which others can be deduced, or
7 Witness the failure of New York's governor and legislature, after years of carefully preparing the
ground for a revision of the excessively punitive Rockefeller drug laws, to pull the trigger on any actual
change.
8 See Robinson & Cahill, supra note 5, at 175.
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on a patient, long-term effort to create a new complete code. To overcome these
obstacles, it is necessary that a reform movement begin with issues where the
conditions for law reform are more propitious. To my mind, we must begin by
addressing areas in which the need for reform is widely perceived, where a political
and intellectual consensus has begun to develop not only on the sense that something
must be done, but on a general direction for change, and where there is some reason to
think that expert drafters could put together reform proposals that could be adopted.
Moreover, it is my belief that many areas that meet these criteria are ones where the
original code was itself inadequate, or has been overtaken by events.
Where is the Code in need of shoring up? Yes, there are places, known to all
criminal law scholars, where we could do better than the drafters originally did, thanks
to the many years in which scholars have taught, reflected, and written on the core
provisions of the Code.9 But these are for the most part minor technical changes in
those portions of the MPC that for the most part have stood the test of time, and where
political forces have had little impact-in other words, in the general part of the Code.
I would submit that the intellectual weaknesses of the MPC are mostly to be found
precisely in those areas where criminal law theorists have been least active, and where
the need for practical reform is greatest: in the sentencing provisions of the Code, in
the definitions of particular crimes that make up its special part, and in those areas of
criminal law that either were neglected by the drafters altogether or that did not exist
when the Code was created. Let me try, then, to identify some priority areas for
reform, and also some things I think should not be high on the agenda.
A. Sentencing
The most radical and systematic criminal reform statutes of the past thirty years,
the ones that reflect not just a desire to increase punishment or respond to topical
crises, but a profound philosophical movement, are those that replace broad judicial
sentencing discretion with systems of mandatory sentences or sentencing guidelines,
of which the federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 is the best known. The MPC's
sentencing provisions were dominated by a rehabilitationist penal philosophy, which
assumed that the primary purpose of criminal punishment was the reform of the
offender, and accordingly provided for broad judicial discretion over sentences (to
permit the punishment to be tailored to the offender and not merely the offense) and
for indeterminate terms of imprisonment (because the judge at sentencing could not
know ex ante, as the parole and prison authorities would later learn, how much time
was actually necessary to accomplish this goal). The MPC was not the most radical
embodiment of this philosophy, but its sentencing provisions and, as I have written
elsewhere, 10 even the structure of its criminal prohibitions, accept the basic framework
9 Ken Simons' contribution to this Symposium suggests some examples. See Kenneth W. Simons,
Should the Model Penal Code's Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179 (2003).
10 Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The Challenge of the
Special Part, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 297, 300-11 (1998).
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of rather broadly defined crimes, wide judicial discretion over punishment within
substantial maximum sentences attached to those crimes, and indeterminate sentences
whose actual length would be determined by penal authorities rather than by judges or
legislatures.
The ALl has correctly decided to focus first on replacing these provisions of the
Code. The area is ripe for substantial revision on virtually every criterion. First, as
noted above, it is one of the few areas in which the Code's provisions reflect a set of
philosophical or policy assumptions that have been widely questioned, both in popular
and academic literature, over the past quarter-century. The view underlying the Code
has been subjected to serious attack, and it is past time for a thoughtful effort either to
defend the ramparts or to accept and work out the implications of the new order.
Second, that attack has had uncertain and incoherent effects on the law of most
jurisdictions. Most of the states retain the superstructure bequeathed by the
rehabilitationist paradigm and embodied in the Code. Yet in virtually every state, that
structure is substantially modified in practice by a host of mandatory minimum
sentences for particular crimes, three-strikes laws and other recidivist statutes, and
vast ad hoc increases in the punitive sanctions attached to particular crimes. In
addition, a variety of alternative sanctions, restitutionary remedies, and forfeiture laws
have been grafted onto the basic prison-and-probation scheme that was at the heart of
the Code. The law of sentencing, in most states, is in precisely the state of decay and
overgrowth as the penal law generally was when Wechsler began his work.
Third, if the law of sentencing is ripe for reform, reformist ideas are also
widespread. A few states and the federal government have adopted comprehensive
sentencing reforms (often, alas, along with any number of the same ad hoc
constructions that have bedeviled their sister jurisdictions). Virtually all of those
reforms feature more narrowly-defined sentencing categories that produce guideline
sentences that to a greater or lesser extent reduce or eliminate the discretion ofjudges
and parole boards. Such efforts have enough in common to suggest a coherent reform
strategy, which has been endorsed in a general way by the American Bar
Association. I" But they also differ in their details in a sufficiently substantial way to
account for wide differences in their public and professional acceptance, from the
widely reviled federal guidelines to more romantically embraced state guidelines in
such disparate states as North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota. The drafters of
a model sentencing scheme thus have both a general paradigm that represents a
tentative consensus among reformers, and several different versions of such reforms
available for comparison and empirical study. Surprisingly little academic work has
been done on these guideline regimes, but the pace of research is picking up, and the
intellectual groundwork for thinking seriously about sentencing has been laid. Thus,
while it cannot be said that there is a universal consensus about sentencing, there is
certainly a sufficiently accepted framework for reform, coupled with enough variation
and uncertainty concerning the effective implementation of that framework, to make
11 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SENTENCING (3d ed. 1994).
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an expert group's recommendations about the details of implementation potentially
influential.
Fourth, sentencing reform offers some hope of practical acceptance. Politically,
a consolidation and codification of the messy sentencing "reforms" of the last twenty
years can be presented as a genuine collation of a variety of initiatives of that era, and
not a wholesale rejection of them or retrenchment to an earlier view that legislatures
and voters have, for good or ill, blamed for rampant crime and accordingly repudiated.
Even the politicians can see that their relatively random efforts to put floors under
sentences of dangerous criminals have resulted in a patchwork of inconsistent laws,
overpopulated prisons, and the continuation in many jurisdictions of parole
institutions that have lost their rationale. And the widely publicized reduction in
crime rates of recent years, coupled with the shift in political focus from street crime
to concerns about terrorism, education and health, and economic policy, has opened
an opportunity to think about sentencing in terms of how and why, rather than simply
how severe.
The chance that a model sentencing statute could result in actual adoption by
legislatures is significant, and any effort to generate a new Model Penal Code must
focus on areas where such change is possible.
B. Rape
The law of rape is the best example, and the one most studied in the academic
literature, of the problems with the special part of the Code to which I've alluded.
The problems addressed in the general part of a penal code are, if not timeless, at least
deeply embedded in the very nature of the western institutions of criminal law. How
do we distinguish criminal law from other mechanisms of social control? When is
punishment appropriate? What principles of justice are intrinsic to the very idea of
criminal punishment? Even the rapid political and social change of the last forty years
has not deeply affected our thinking about these questions, or altered the basic
principles and practices embodied in our answers.
But the particular social problems to which these principles and practices are
applied can change quite rapidly, as economic and social institutions evolve and
political regimes break down and are replaced. Feminism has been the most explosive
engine of social change in our lifetimes, and has resulted in the most profound
reconsideration of our basic institutions of family, reproduction, and economic
activity. The Model Penal Code arrived just before this transformation, and thus, it is
at its most outdated where the law touches the most violent edge of sexual interaction,
the crime of rape.
My purpose here is not to catalogue the ways in which the MPC's provisions on
rape and sexual assault are inadequate to current mores, or the number of legislative
and judicial reforms that have rendered its provisions irrelevant, in a way that none of
its other specific crime definitions are, to criminal law as it actually exists today. 2
12 That is the subject of Deborah Denno's contribution to this forum. See Denno, supra note 4.
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Nor do I seek to propound or defend any particular modernized or reformed version of
a rape statute. For present purposes, it is enough to argue that conditions are ripe for a
body like the ALl to propose an effective model statute, and to make a genuine
intellectual and practical contribution by doing so. Of course, rape is a hot-button
issue, and one can expect any particular reform proposal to be attacked from the left
as inadequately protective of women's sexual autonomy, from the right as
incompatible with traditional patriarchal family values, and from all sides as
insufficiently punitive. But here, as in sentencing, quite a variety of statutes have
been implemented or proposed, addressing in inconsistent ways a significant number
of distinct issues, solving or causing a host of interpretive questions, penal problems,
and social consequences. And here, too, the general trend of those reforms suggests
that there are principles and attitudes that, whatever the disagreement at the level of
detail, are widely agreed upon. An effort to collect, compare, and evaluate these
efforts, and to form a consensus about what has worked and what has not, is surely
due. A model statute on sexual assault could thus address a real problem with real
hope of success.
My only disagreement with Deborah Denno's excellent analysis of this problem
reflects my proposed emphasis on practical reform. It is actually of little importance
that the MPC's provisions on rape, let alone the commentaries that attempted to
explain them at a time when they were already being questioned, seem embarrassingly
outdated. It would matter if those provisions constituted a model that might have a
negative impact on contemporary legislation, or on the ideas of future generations of
law students. But the MPC's sexual assault article is so far removed from the current
debate as to be irrelevant. It matters very little to me whether a model sexual assault
law is propounded as part of a comprehensive effort to revise the MPC, or as a revised
MPC component to be dropped into the existing MPC, or as a stand-alone Model
Sexual Assault Law independent of the MPC. What matters is that legislatures be
given a text that represents the best thinking of a cross-section of experts on problems
that legislators have shown they want to address, but that has so far frustrated their
efforts to develop a well-drafted, comprehensive reform that can generate acceptance
across jurisdictional lines. Developing such a model law would have independent
value apart from any MPC revision, and if we were to have a full revision of the Code,
this would be an excellent place to start to build practical respect for the project.
C. Narcotics
When the MPC was promulgated, the "war on drugs" had not yet been
declared. ' 3 Narcotics offenses were punished much less severely, and those convicted
13 1 think I first heard the "war" metaphor in the late 1960s when the rock group Steppenwolf, not
otherwise known for its influence on the policy choices of Republican presidents, sang "If I were the
president of this land... I'd declare total war on the pusher man," in a song called "The Pusher."
STEPPENWOLF, THE PUSHER (Irving Music 1968). It should come as little surprise that a drug policy
based on rock lyrics has not proved all that successful.
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of possession and sale of narcotics made up a much smaller portion of the prison
population, than is now the case. The drafters of the MPC simply left narcotics
prohibitions out of their Code, not by recommending decriminalization of narcotics as
a desirable policy, but simply by defining the whole sordid subject as beneath their
notice. As penalties for drug dealing have escalated, and drug statutes have become
more elaborate, academic attention has remained averted, limited at best to the
abstract question of legalization of drugs, with virtually no discussion of the
appropriate nature of drug statutes or penalties in the real world in which legalization
is not a politically respectable option.
A revised Code cannot responsibly follow this path. The role of criminal law in
discouraging-the consumption of dangerous drugs cannot be ignored by anything that
pretends to be a model criminal code for jurisdictions that devote a larger portion of
their law enforcement budgets to narcotics enforcement than to almost any other type
of crime. If narcotics laws are to be left out of a revised MPC, that omission must be
deliberate, the result of a conscious decision that some other approach to the problem
of drugs is preferable.
I doubt, however, that a truly serious approach to the narcotics problem would
conclude that complete decriminalization is the preferred course. Our society suffers
enough from abuse of the drugs we already make relatively freely available, and the
criminal law plays a part in the control even of the legal drugs (for example, limiting
sale to minors or prohibiting the smuggling of untaxed liquor and cigarettes). Some
form of criminal regulation will surely be desired as part of a comprehensive drug
policy, 14 but what should it look like?
Even proponents of legalization, moreover, should take a lesson from the
treatment of another controversial subject in the original MPC. Many of the drafters
of the MPC opposed capital punishment, but they recognized that a code that did not
include a death penalty would not be taken seriously. So the Code offered an option
of abolition, and as an alternative, a novel approach to the imposition of the death
penalty through structured jury discretion.1 5 The MPC approach did not initially
attract much political support, but in the wake of the Supreme Court's revolutionary
decision in Furman v. Georgia, invalidating on constitutional grounds capital
punishment as then administered in the United States, followed by its retrenchment
and approval of structured jury discretion statutes, the MPC's approach has essentially
become the law of the land in jurisdictions that continue to use the death penalty.16
Both conservatives critical of the Supreme Court's intervention and liberal
abolitionists have a stake in pretending that no good came of this development, but
there is little question in my mind that, whatever ineradicable problems of fairness,
finality and human rights continue to make capital punishment controversial, the
14 A good source on the substantive trade-offs that will have to be part of any serious effort to
reform our approach to drugs of all kinds is MARK KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR
RESULTS (1992).
15 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
16 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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MPC's system both restricts and to some degree rationalizes the use of the death
penalty in ways that the former death penalty regime could not. A similar reform of
narcotics laws, however unsatisfactory to ideologues on all sides of the debate, might
well be possible if academics and practitioners seriously debated a model narcotics
statute.
Academic lawyers have made little contribution to the study of criminal narcotics
statutes, either by addressing the most effective role for criminal law in the
suppression of dangerous drugs or by considering technical issues of statutory
draftsmanship. Existing penal codes, perhaps in consequence, are quite diverse,
despite a general agreement that severe punishment is the best reaction to the sale of
illegal narcotics. Moreover, while there is little evidence of a broad popular demand
for decriminalizing narcotics use, in a world in which prison expenses are mounting
and public acceptance of non-criminal alternatives for many narcotics offenders is
growing, a serious reform that de-emphasized criminal sanctions without threatening
to turn the streets into legalized drug marts might prove attractive to many
jurisdictions.
Once again, whether this is phase two of a comprehensive MPC revision or a
stand-alone project, a Model Controlled Substances Act would potentially be a major
contribution to the debate that could stand a significant chance of passage in
jurisdictions that are considering reform in this area.
D. Domestic Violence, Bias Crime, and the Problem of Specificity
The powerful feminist influence on criminal law issues has not been limited to
the law of sexual assault. Domestic violence is another area that was of little concern
to male opinion leaders at the time the Code was promulgated, but that has since
become a prominent area of law reform. Similarly, the special concerns of minorities
or disempowered groups were not on the criminal law agenda in the 1950s; today,
those concerns prompted widespread adoption of (among other laws) hate crime
statutes. These topics are of concern to MPC reformers not only because, as in the
other areas I've discussed above, the MPC is silent or inadequate about them, but also
because they represent a paradigm of a broader criminal law trend that requires
consideration in a revised MPC.
The Code makes no specific reference to domestic violence or hate crimes, and
does not treat assault or homicide within the family unit or against disfavored targets
any differently than such crimes committed in other contexts. Over the past twenty
years, legislatures, courts, and police departments have repeatedly addressed domestic
violence and bias crimes as topics of specialized concern, adopting policies and
statutes particularly designed to address these problems. Looked at narrowly, one can
see the Code's lack of specific provisions about these subjects as simply another
instance of the Code's failure to anticipate the success of the feminist revolution in
reconceptualizing the public and private domains, and in elevating issues affecting
women and children to the forefront of the political agenda. On this ground alone, the
subject requires rethinking in a revised MPC. Even on the utilitarian premises of the
2003]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
Code, revised information about the differential utility of strategies of criminal
intervention in dealing with different types of assaultive conduct suggests revised
attention to those categories.
But the Code's submersion of domestic assault within larger, more abstract
categories reflects a larger issue of penal code drafting, and one that lies at the
crossroads of two explosive changes in the political climate generally and the
philosophy of criminal law in the years since the MPC appeared. First, the sentencing
philosophy of the MPC, as noted above, dictated the drafting of broad criminal
prohibitions. The Code offers only two categories of assault-not surprisingly,
because it only offers three levels of felony altogether. If punishment is not to be
determined primarily by the offense of conviction, but rather by the personal
characteristics of the offender (e.g., recidivism, and amenability to reform), there is
little reason to discriminate the very many gradations of seriousness of particular
assaults (e.g., type of weapon used, degree of harm inflicted, and nature of victim).
All of this is "merely" a matter of grading, relevant not to the wrongfulness of the
conduct, but to the sentence to be imposed. Under the Code's sentencing scheme,
such matters will all be left to the judge, to be balanced against the various offender
characteristics that will also determine punishment in the particular case.
But in a world of just deserts retributive punishment, where the legislature or a
sentencing commission attempts to dictate a more precise punishment based primarily
upon the degree of harm, special attention to the precise degree of wrongfulness of
particular species of assault becomes crucial. Is an assault on a child that causes little
physical harm worse than one on an adult that causes a more serious injury? Is that
assault worse if it is committed in the home by the child's caregiver rather than on the
street by a stranger? Looked at in this way, the new emphasis on domestic violence is
part of a broader set of questions about the desirability of more narrowly-drawn
statutes that make subtler gradations of wrongdoing than the broad-stroke
classifications of the MPC.
Second, it is no accident that domestic violence, and the somewhat related notion
of provisions enhancing punishment for bias crime, are principal examples of the
demand for more specific criminal prohibitions and gradations. The political
movement of previously-marginal groups to obtain equal respect and to advance their
too-often-ignored interests has marked American politics over the past forty years,
and has had a profound and controversial impact on actual criminal codes. The debate
over hate crimes exemplifies this controversy. Even without the movement for
sentencing more specifically tailored to wrongdoing, the disagreement between those
who believe that the criminal law should specially recognize crimes motivated by
racial or other group animosity, and those who believe that violence is violence
regardless of the motivation of the offender or identity of the victim, has great
symbolic importance. For minorities who have been the victims of institutionalized
violence, the special recognition of such crimes constitutes a directive to law
enforcement to take them seriously, and a necessary counterweight to social attitudes
that tolerate or ignore the extent of such violence. When that symbolic need is mixed
with concrete increases in punishment, the issue becomes all the more important.
[Vol 1:219234
REVISING THE MODEL PENAL CODE
Such statutes, however, are attacked by their opponents as special interest laws
that at best overcomplicate the law and at worst provide "special" status for some
victims, the overt converse of the hidden prejudice that makes it more likely that the
murderer of a wealthy white woman will be executed than the killer of a poor black
man. Even supporters of bias crime laws must acknowledge that the opponents'
caricature is premised on a genuine concern. After all, even a "hate crime" statute is a
generalization-more specific than a prohibition on assault of all kinds, but more
general than other statutes that could be imagined. Any group can fight for special
attention to its particular needs, and insist on its particular dignity. Do we need a
special statute for assaults against the elderly? Against immigrants? Against women?
Advertisements in the New York City subways remind us that the New York
Legislature recently passed a law raising simple assaults against subway conductors or
bus drivers to the same felonious level as assaults on police officers, firefighters, and
emergency service workers. "Where do you draw the line?" may not be a good
argument against specification; it is nevertheless a question that must be asked about
any particular effort to refine the Code's categories.
The question of specificity and refinement in criminal statutes is not limited to
victim groups. Over the past twenty years, legislatures have responded to various
novel (or at least newly-publicized) methods of committing crimes by adding new
(and usually redundant) criminal prohibitions, or by creating new subcategories of
traditional crimes with enhanced punishments. Is fraud committed with a computer
more serious or more threatening than other types of theft? Is seducing a child by e-
mail worse than doing so in a schoolyard or a confessional? Is armed robbery really a
different and more serious kind of crime when the property stolen is a car, and a cute
neologism (carjacking) can be coined to describe it?
These are not intended as rhetorical questions. In recent years, legislatures have
adopted all kinds of new statutes, responding to new situations and perceived new
social problems. No doubt many of these are politically-motivated responses to
sensational press coverage of particularly lurid crimes, which add nothing of value to
traditional penal codes. But some of them may have merit, at least in a Code that may
have to attempt, in light of new theories of punishment, to draw more degrees and
distinctions within traditional crimes than the MPC did. In any comprehensive project
for a revised MPC, one of the most important projects will be deciding the extent to
which the Code should incorporate more gradations of punishment, and specify a
greater number of aggravated and mitigated degrees of offenses than the MPC drafters
thought necessary.
E. RICO, Money Laundering, and Terrorism
Led by the United States Congress, legislative bodies have radically transformed
the approach to organized criminal enterprises by developing new forms of accessorial
liability. To a considerable extent, these new statutes ignore traditional formulations
of culpability for the acts of others, and strike out in their own directions to develop
new forms of prosecution that match the increasingly proactive investigative
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techniques of undercover infiltration, electronic surveillance, and the use of informers
and turncoat cooperating witnesses, which in turn have developed to attack crime that
is systematic and organized rather than episodic and chaotic. The RICO statute,
adopted in 1970, expanded conspiracy law in novel ways, permitting prosecution of
organized criminals (and terrorists or members of other organized illegal enterprises)
for involvement in organizations whose members commit a diverse range of crimes.
Money laundering laws, which first appeared in the 1980s, created new substantive
crimes that could be conceived as a specialized kind of accessory-after-the-fact
liability, analogous to specialized preparatory crimes that fill gaps in attempt law.
The expansion of global terrorism has produced not only innovative (or
threatening) revisions of traditional investigative methods, but also new substantive
crimes. The scope of the novel crime of providing material support to terrorist
organizations has received little academic attention. Could the allegations against
defendants like John Walker Lindh or the Buffalo-area Arab Americans or
representatives of Arab- or Muslim-oriented charities have produced liability under
traditional criminal statutes? If the answer is no, does that reflect the inadequacy of
traditional statutes or the impropriety of the innovative prosecutions? Do the new,
expansive statutes violate our longstanding principles of criminal liability? And if
new forms of liability are necessary to impose deserved punishment in such cases,
how should the statutes be drafted?
These are vitally important questions, which call into question principles of
criminal liability long thought fundamental. Would-be revisers of the MPC can
ignore them and worry about refining the Code's solutions to traditional dilemmas of
self-defense doctrine or mistake of law that have proved essentially adequate, or they
can attempt to provide meaningful assistance to legislatures grappling with new forms
of criminal activity.
My discussion of these five areas at best sketches a partial agenda for a revised
MPC, but it suggests the difficult and important intellectual work that could be done,
work that addresses issues that are actually on the political agenda of lawmakers. No
doubt others can come up with additional problems of the same ilk.
VII. THE ANTI-AGENDA
If these are the affirmative priorities for a revised MPC for the twenty-first
century, what are the negative priorities, the traps that we must avoid falling into?
What I have proposed is an agenda for revised criminal statutes that addresses real
political and law enforcement issues, that sees a revised MPC as an opportunity to
address today's law reform needs as the original Code did those of its era. The flip
side of that agenda is to avoid-at least in the immediate future-a focus on purely
academic concerns that would distract the effort from real problems. There are two
complementary pitfalls to avoid, each of which has considerable attractions for
academics: thinking too big and thinking too small.
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A. The Perils of Radical Reform
A Model Penal Code revision project should avoid the temptation to rethink the
Code's basic organization and approach. Such an effort could generate considerable
interest among academics. Fundamental premises of the Code have been vigorously
criticized, most prominently by George Fletcher, 7 and it would be natural for a
serious discussion of a new criminal code to begin at the beginning, debating the
merits of those criticisms. Paul Robinson, who has defended the substance of the
MPC against Fletcher's critique,' 8 has also proposed a radically different organization
of a criminal code, one that would dramatically simplify the conduct rules addressed
to the general population. 9 It would be equally natural for a group of academics to
consider the merits of such an innovative approach.
Quite apart from the merits of these arguments, a revised model code that
adopted either approach would be a demoralizing waste of effort. The purpose of the
MPC, or of any revised version of it, is to be a model for actual legislation. The
original MPC was a great success not only because of its intellectual merit, but
because American legislatures felt a need for codification, and because the product
presented to them was essentially consistent with lawyers' and legislators'
understanding of what a code should look like and what the common law of crimes
with which they were familiar provided. To the extent that the MPC revised or
reformed prevailing American criminal law norms, it did so incrementally, for the
most part by explaining how its formulations fit better with the general assumptions of
those norms than the formulations they replaced.
Today, there is little market for extensive criminal law reform. Popular
grumblings about "the failed criminal justice system" have little to do with the issues
of substantive criminal law that preoccupy academics. Such discontent appears to
have reflected general unhappiness with rising crime rates, and to have subsided
somewhat as the incidence of crime declined in the latter 1990s. At any rate, nothing
indicates that legislatures or courts or criminal lawyers believe that the basic
organization of the codes they work with requires upheaval. Moreover, the moral and
intellectual authority of academic advisory bodies is surely far lower than it was in the
1960s. A revised code that proposed dramatic changes in the organizing principles of
criminal law could only be greeted as a typically unrealistic product of the ivory
tower.
I confess that I would probably strike a different balance if I were more
enthusiastic about the merits of Fletcher's or Robinson's arguments. To that extent,
my argument perhaps depends on an implicit intellectual defense of the existing
structure of the Code, which this is not the place to elaborate. But I suspect that my
17 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model Penal Code, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 3 (1998).
See generally GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (1978).
I Paul H. Robinson, In Defense of the Model Penal Code: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REv. 25 (1998).
19 PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW (1997).
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lack of enthusiasm for these proposals is widely shared, and that time spent debating
such revolutionary change in penal codes would not, in the end, lead to their adoption
even by an academic advisory body, let alone to their implementation by legislatures.
My point is that whatever chance there is to influence actual law depends on
addressing issues that are on the real-world agenda, and on doing so in a way that
respects, rather than seeks to overturn, conventional legal and moral assumptions.
Thus, my own hopes for development of a revised code would begin with specific
model statutes in areas in need of concrete reform, which could be adopted by a
legislature within an MPC-based Code, and to gradually build a revised Model Code
that would take the same general form as its great predecessor.2°
B. The Danger of the Arcane
Another potential pitfall is one familiar to law school curricular reformers. Such
reforms tend to begin, logically enough, at the beginning, focusing first and primarily
on the first-year curriculum. Somehow, despite a general consensus that the most
unsatisfying part of the law school program is in the latter years, curricular reform
discussions bog down in yet another revision of the part of the curriculum that works
best. The tendency to tinker with the least-failed parts of the program is driven by
factors that would also affect comprehensive penal code reform: principally, the desire
to begin at the beginning, debating fundamental premises before matters of detail, and
the fact that the issues are more familiar to the participants and thus easier to debate
than issues that were never adequately articulated in the first place.
The most important problems with the MPC are in the special part. Changing
social and political conditions have a more rapid impact on this highly contingent
portion of the criminal law, only more slowly changing basic notions of culpability.
The latter, however, are far more interesting to academic theorists, precisely because
of their timeless quality. But probably for this very reason, the general part of the
Code, despite any number of sites of potential improvement, was more satisfactory
from the beginning.
I don't mean to suggest that possibilities for improvement should be ignored.
But once again, concerns of priority in the allocation of intellectual resources demand
a different focus for any immediate reform project. Legal academics can continue to
talk about what they want to talk about, and to have as much effect on policy
deliberations as they have had over the past quarter-century. That does not require a
revised MPC project. But the issues I have proposed above are ones that serious
students of criminal law should be addressing in a law reform project. Perhaps it is
already unrealistic to think that legislators could be brought to systematically and
thoughtfully revisit the reactive improvisations of the past few decades. But that is a
20 Paul Robinson's report on his work with the Illinois and Kentucky penal code reform projects
strongly implies that when it comes to concrete reform, he too is prepared to put to one side more radical
experiments in form in favor of a structure familiar to legislators and based in large part on the MPC. See
Robinson, supra note 6, at 173.
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far more important and promising project than revising aspects of a model code that
were embraced by legislatures when general recodification was on the public agenda
(and thus would be hard to generate interest in changing, now that such general reform
is not a major public issue) or that failed adoption in the first place for lack of
practical appeal.2 In short, a reform program that concentrated on technical fixes to
the relatively arcane concepts of interest to academics would lack any urgency or
political appeal. It might generate an "improved" MPC for use in classrooms, but it
would squander whatever opportunity might exist to address serious problems with
existing penalty codes.
VIII. CONCLUSION: LAW REFORM AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
I am not here concerned with the purposes or nature of legal scholarship, though
I hope I have set out a number of questions that would repay significant scholarly
inquiry. What I have tried to do, rather, is to insist that the MPC was, and that any
revision must also be, a law reform project, not primarily or solely a work of
scholarship. The first Code succeeded admirably in some of its primary reform
objectives. If a second is to have any comparable success, its drafters must focus, as
their predecessors did, on those areas of criminal law where the need for reform is
greatest, because the original Code was unsatisfactory, or silent, or failed to anticipate
developments that have rendered its original provisions antiquated. In seeking those
areas, our best guides will not be those academics who have written about the core
issues of criminal law that have largely been settled, as a practical matter, by the
MPC, but the legislative bodies who for a quarter-century have been churning out
criminal statutes addressing what they and their constituents regard as the pressing
criminal law problems of our time. If we follow those guides, we will find statutes
that are often thoughtless, poorly-drafted, and counterproductive, but that identify
genuine problems that the Model Code of the 1950s and 1960s did not adequately
solve. Could there be a more fertile ground for reform, or a more important set of
issues for criminal law scholars to address?
21 Ken Simons' contribution to this forum is a good example of the kinds of reforms I would not
make a priority. See Simons, supra note 9. This is not a matter of disagreement with any or all of his
particular criticisms of the Code's culpability rules; I find some of his suggestions appealing and others
not, and his discussion is a significant contribution to the debate over these issues. It is simply that a
project to debate his proposals for reform could easily spend years in interesting discussion, only to
produce a document that would stand little chance of adoption-not because legislatures found it
substantively less attractive than the existing MPC-based formulations, but simply because there is (for
good reason) little sense that the existing formulations are causing confusion or injustice in their practical
application in the real world.
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